New Books
Having Thought By John Haugeland Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1998, x + 390 pp. This book is a collection of thirteen essays, all but two of which have been published before. They represent more than two decades of work, and show the evolution of their author from a quick-witted, broad-minded, and deep philosopher of cognitive science into the major figure he is today, one of the leaders of what one might call a neo-phenomenological school of philosophy. It is worth having all the essays together, particularly because the final essay, a 57-page outline, previously unpublished, of what is almost a theory of truth and objectivity, is quite hard, and is helpfully approached by way of the earlier papers: they get one used to Haugeland's philosophical style, and raise in other contexts some of the issues which are pursued there. And many of the earlier papers deserve to be regarded as classics in their field.
The book is divided into four sections. The first two-'Mind' and 'Matter'-show the virtues of the early Haugeland. He is ontologically broad-minded, being unimpressed by attempts to reduce science to physics or to think of objects as being all of one type. He is a master of distinctions: between different types of event, between different kinds of holism, between different kinds of explanation. He produces fruitful definitions: not expected to be completely precise, or immune to every possible counterexample, but aiming to capture the spirit of what is to be defined, and doing so in a way which is quirky enough to be interesting, as well as being initially plausible. He is adept at choosing examples which are both compelling and mundane enough to be readily intelligible: for instance, the use of 'wave hits' on a cork in a swimming pool to demonstrate the oddity of identifying what he calls 'robust events' with what he calls 'mathematical events', in the fifth paper, 'Weak Supervenience'. And the writing is careful without being fussy, informal without being sloppy, and mercifully free of jokiness and self-advertisement. These papers all give a sense of leisure dedicated to a high purpose: understanding is worth having in its own right, whether or not it advances a research programme or enables one to score a victory in a debating contest, and it is worth spending the time it takes to acquire it.
The third and fourth sections-'Meaning' and 'Truth'-seem to me to have a different character. Whereas the emphasis of the earlier papers is gently negative, urging resistance to simplistic assimilation and reduction, the later papers can be seen to be working towards some positive understanding of intentionality, if we take that to be the relation between thoughts or representations and their objects. But there is a clear connection in theme, even so: we can think of the later papers as working towards the metaphysics which is needed if the ontological broadmindedness of the earlier papers is to be tenable. The later papers also show an increasing affinity to philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, the early Heidegger in particular, although they do not lose touch with writings on the philosophy of cognitive science. (The obvious link between the two is the work of Hubert Dreyfus, who is singled out for special mention as an influence.) The crucial papers in the later sections are 'Mind Embodied and Embedded', 'Objective Perception', and 'Truth and Rule-Following' (though 'Pattern and Being' and 'Understanding: Dennett and Searle' also provide helpful illumination).
In 'Mind Embodied and Embedded' Haugeland questions the fundamentally Cartesian but still dominant assumption that there is some kind of interface between mind and body and between mind and world. The assumption is considered in its effects upon AI modelling, and is questioned in part by noticing the kinds of bias which lead to it, and in part by considering AI models (such as those suggested by Rod Brooks) which operate without that assumption. Questioning the Cartesian assumption leads one to think of being sensitive to the world as a kind of skilful interaction, rather than as having representations.
In 'Objective Perception' Haugeland considers what it is to perceive objects as objects. He shows a typically generous understanding of the objects of perception, taking chess perception as a central example: its objects will include positions, threats and moves, rather than just the pieces. He assumes that in order to see something as a knight fork, for example, one must have a concept of a knight fork. Something like a knight fork is 'constituted' by the normative standards which regulate chess, and to have a concept of a knight fork one must be committed to those standards. Such commitment is practically incredible in the absence of language, but is, he thinks, in principle independent of it.
'Truth and Rule-Following', which is new in this volume, puts together the central lessons of these papers and develops them further. We can simplify its focus by saying that it addresses the question, 'How is it possible for there to be a following of a rule which makes room for truth?' The problem is to make sense of the normativity involved in rule-following and truth. Haugeland argues against attempts to ground it in biologically evolved normativity, which is essentially the normativity of function: the problem is that biological normativity makes no room for a distinction between proper functioning and truth. He also argues against attempts to ground the normativity required for truth in socially instituted normativity (roughly, the normativity involved in customs and manners, in which societies demand some conformity): the problem is that this does not permit one to make sense of everyone in a community being consistently wrong. Haugeland argues that what is needed is to make sense of a contrast between constitutive standards and other kinds of rule. Recognition of, and commitment to a constitutive standard will be a matter of having a 'constitutive skill' (such as being able to check for illegal moves in chess); constitutive skills are to be distinguished from mundane skills (which are exercised, for example, in coping with the game as required by the rules). In the basic case, in which rules are not followed by following other rules, there will be no test for correctness which is independent of exercising the skills involved; but this need not mean that there is no such thing as correctness.
Given that mundane skills are different from constitutive skills, it is possible for there to be tension between them: in particular, two mundane skills may conflict, in the light of the exercise of a constitutive skill. In these circumstances one may modify one or other of the mundane skills, or one may modify the constitutive skill. (Readers with Quinean backgrounds will recognize in this something like a contrast between analytic and synthetic judgments, but without Quine's assimilation of analyticity to unrevisability.) The claim seems to be that the possibility of such tension is in effect the possibility of recognizing a kind of truth and falsehood which is not simply a matter of the legality or illegality of a move. And this also entitles one to the notion of objectivity in the phenomena with which the skills are concerned, and correspondingly to the notion of an object as such. Haugeland says:
In a constituted domain … skills and objects are made for each other: the objective skills are co-constituted along with the objective phenomena, and the latter are precisely what the former respond to (and otherwise deal with). (p. 346) This strikes me as a deep and suggestive account; and it is provocatively illustrated by a series of modifications of chess, to give one a sense of what it would be for there to be rule-following of the requisite kind.
The obvious worry about this position is that it is insufficiently realistic. Haugeland is sensitive to this worry, but does not seem to me to do enough to dispel it. He adopts as a provocative temporary slogan the claim 'To constitute is to bring into being ' (p. 325) , and notes that the notion of 'bringing into being' here seems to ask to be understood either as creating objects (which would mean that the objects did not exist before the constitution), or else as simply counting things as objects (which would presuppose the objecthood of some objects). He prefers to understand constitution as 'letting be', which is supposed not to have such connotations. Unfortunately, the idea that skills and objects are 'made for each other' seems no better than the idea that the objects are created, unless the skills are understood as operating against a background which has some independent objectivity (so that we can understand there being some difficulty in acquiring them). Haugeland does indeed make an appeal to some such independent background when he leaves room for there to be an issue over whether a game is playable (pp. 330-1), but he gives no account of the constraint it provides; and it is not easy to fit into the rest of his picture.
This worry, once raised, also infects the distinction between mundane and constitutive skills. Haugeland seems to me right to distinguish between the constitutive and the mundane, and right to think that their combination is essential for the possibility of genuine testing; and his view that skills are fundamental seems plausible too. What is unclear is how these (or any) skills can be understood as skills, properly so called, unless they are subject to some constraint which is more thoroughly external to them than Haugeland seems to permit. And a trace of the same difficulty seems to me to appear in Haugeland's attempt to make sense of the concept of an illegal move (pp. 331-3). He notes that it is apparently paradoxical, and attempts to dissolve the problem by distinguishing between what is conceivable and what is possible. I cannot see how this works. I suspect that the concept of an illegal move can only be made intelligible if we understand chess as being played in a world which is not itself constituted by chess; in which, that is, there is a sense of 'moving a piece' which is not covered by 'following a rule of chess'.
But despite the fact that it remains unclear how Haugeland can deal with this problem, the essays in the last two parts of this book provide a rich resource for anyone thinking seriously about mind and world. The value of many of the insights which are provided by the careful and thoughtful discussions is independent of the plausibility of the final theory, and there are too many of them to be more than hinted at here. Some analytical philosophers may be embarrassed or irritated by some of the more obviously Heideggerian or neo-Heideggerian locutions ('The general form of free human commitment-or care or faith-is love', p. 2; 'Abiding in the meaningful', p. 235), but this should not put them off making the effort to understand this honest and deep engagement with the fundamental problems of philosophy. The book as a whole has understanding as its topic, is dedicated unostentatiously to the goal of understanding its topic, and should leave its readers with a clear sense of the value of understanding in its own right.
Michael Morris

Language and Reality: Modern Perspectives on Wittgenstein
By I · lham Dilman Leuven: Peeters 1998, xxiii + 303 pp., 290 BEF pb Dilman's book is a late manifestation of that strange and distinctive phenomenon, Swansea Wittgensteinianism. The movement emerged in the 1950s, following the arrival in the Swansea Philosophy Department of Rush Rhees, the friend and student of Wittgenstein. Among its best known exponents were Peter Winch, Roy Holland and, later, Winch's pupil, D. Z. Phillips. Dilman himself taught in Swansea for most of his working life, after research at Cambridge as a pupil of John Wisdom, Wittgenstein's close colleague. Swansea was, then, for forty years the home of a characteristic and readily recognizable style of philosophical activity which was centred on the later work of Wittgenstein. It interpreted that work, however, in ways that ran counter in many respects to those in which it was becoming assimilated into the mainstream of British philosophy of the time. Swansea set itself apart from that mainstream, enjoying the scorn, as much, perhaps, as the secret admiration, that such a posture inevitably brought with it. Over the last thirty years Dilman has produced more than a dozen books on a variety of philosophical subjects. Language and Reality collects together some fifteen of his essays written over this period, about a half of which have been previously published. All deal in one way or another with Wittgensteinian themes and many do so, more or less polemically, by criticizing rival interpretations of Wittgenstein's work or opposing treatments of Wittgenstein's topics. Predictably enough, Quine and Kripke come in for the fiercest attacks, Strawson, on whom there are three essays, gets a mixed reception, while Bambrough, Drury and Von Wright are accorded more sympathetic treatment for less egregious errors. The harsher his criticisms, however, the more Dilman is uncomfortably aware that he may be engaging in a conversation of the deaf. Of Quine Dilman remarks, 'I am not so distant to the tradition to which he belongs that I cannot understand what he says' (pp 182-3): Dilman's criticisms are, he implies, ones with which a Quinean should reckon. But there is a prevailing sense of the Swansea fortress being defended against barbarians who are simply passing by it. What is the strength of these defences? We can, perhaps, identify three themes of Dilman's book in which it may be found.
The first, and most pertinent to the critique of Quine, is anti-scientism. Dilman repeatedly attacks the idea that science has a claim superior to that of other fields of understanding in determining the nature of reality. 'In fact,' he claims, 'quite the reverse is the case' (p. 71), for scientific discourse is, in Wittgenstein's phrase, merely 'a suburb of our language' and thus peripheral to and dependent upon our richer everyday talk, with its intricate connections with our ordinary lives. To ignore this, like Quine, is, Dilman believes, dehumanising. To conceive of philosophy as in the service of science impoverishes it. The argument here is an anti-monistic one: there is not 'some one big thing called 'reality' (p. 281) because what we think of as reality is relative to the kind of discourse we are engaging in. What counts as reality for science is different and discontinuous from what so counts for religion, say. To suppose otherwise is unjustified metaphysics.
This argument, stemming from the later Wittgenstein's picture of language as comprising a variety of differently grounded language games, is a compelling one and it has underpinned Swansea's antagonism to a strand in analytic philosophy still dominant in, for example, the philosophy of mind. But Dilman does not fully face up to why this strand is so dominant, namely because the very ubiquity of scientific explanations challenges other discourses to show how they too can make sense of the world without fitting into a single systematic narrative. It is the difficulty of responding to this shift in the burden of proof that Dilman does not confront because he simply refuses to accept the burden. Yet without agreement on the ethics of argument at this point debate cannot get started.
Scientific realism is, trivially, a kind of realism, while Dilman announces himself, and the later Wittgenstein, to be anti-realist. It is not entirely clear that Dilman intends this in the contemporary sense in which so-called antirealists hold that reality cannot outrun our capacity to know or conceive of it. For what Dilman is really anxious to deny is that 'our language and forms of reasoning must be based on an independent reality' (p. xii). Dilman aims to illustrate this Wittgensteinian denial both by rejecting realism about meanings as something we apprehend in understanding what is said and in opposing Bambrough's view that the similarities in nature which general words pick out exist there independently of our language. Realism of nei-ther kind is needed for a non-arbitrary use of language, since this is ensured by the grounding of language in shared forms of life.
Yet, in running these two kinds of realism together as targets of what he calls Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution, Dilman seems to me to have strayed from the true Swansea path and to have dallied with idealism. For, while he hastens to assure us that he does not deny there were physical things before language, he says that the kind of world we live in is dependent upon language. If this means a world in which things are red or green, say, then surely there were red and green things before language too, whatever later form of life is needed for us to have the concepts of these colours. Bambrough does not, of course, deny that such a form of life is required for colour concepts, as he would have done had he thought instead that these concepts have their basis in reflecting an independently graspable reality. But Bambrough's realism does not require this, for realism, properly understood, is not about the basis of language, but about the conception of reality that a possession of language implies.
Dilman overplays the Copernican Revolution history of Wittgenstein's own thought, making the Tractus a realist text, the Investigations an antirealist one. But there is no good evidence for reading the Tractatus as somehow grounding language in an independent reality: quite the contrary, for Wittgenstein's whole system there is designed to ensure that language can capture any possible reality, so that what counts as reality must answer to this demand. This obvious fact may be obscured by Wittgenstein's starting the book by talking about the world and only later about propositions. Yet while Lewis Carroll started his Symbolic Logic with 'The Universe contains Things', Wittgenstein insists that 'the world is the totality of facts, not of things'. Carroll assumes we know what the universe is like and says what he thinks is needed to show how proper it is that propositions should contain subject terms that stand for things. Wittgenstein, by contrast, characterizes the world in a way that makes no sense unless we already have the concept of a proposition as that which a fact makes true. Carroll is, in Dilman's sense, a realist here, but Wittgenstein is not.
Neither does the Tractatus maintain, as Dilman holds it does, that meanings are abstract objects, shadows of reality that we grasp in speaking and thinking. Far from it, since Wittgenstein insists that even in the mind propositions are pictures, concrete structures of elements which make a direct contact with reality without any Fregean intermediaries. All this is something that Wittgenstein infers from the capacity of language to represent reality. We do not need, as Dilman supposes, to know what these structures are in order to talk. It is simply that they must exist if we are to apply our words to the world with understanding, as we do in the ordinary course of life. Peter Winch was right in detecting an essential unity in Wittgenstein's work. Dilman does not recognize it. Perhaps this is because anti-realism seems to him a natural corollary of the opposition to monism his anti-scientism depends upon, and certainly Wittgenstein moved from a monastic conception of reality in the Tractatus to an exuberant pluralism in his later work. But this is unconnected with the realism issue.
The third theme I wish to touch upon again takes the attack on scientific realism as its starting point, namely the stress that Dilman and other Swansea philosophers place on the personal point of philosophical activity. Wittgenstein is not understood by scientific philosophers, Dilman maintains, precisely because they fail to see that philosophy is an activity whose point lies in the working through and resolution of problems that people have, and that they encounter these philosophical problems only because they already have personal problems, problems of life. The challenge of a philosophy which calls for seriousness and honesty is thus a challenge 'at the level of the personal' (p. 236), and Wittgenstein's dedication to philosophy is seen, like that of Socrates, as the right sort of response to it. It is not just Wittgenstein's philosophical methods and orientation which provide exemplars for our philosophical practice, but also his attitude to philosophy and to the place it occupied in his life. It is in view of this relationship to Wittgenstein-a relationship rightly regarded as discipleshipthat Swansea philosophers have been most open to derision, their own lives seemingly lacking the dramatic intensity of Wittgenstein's own, which made his sort of attitude to the subject appear so impressive.
It is hard, however, to see why one should adopt the Wittgensteinian attitude, and there are, perhaps, even reasons why one should not. These come out most clearly in considering how Dilman deploys his commendation of the attitude in replying to Von Wright. Von Wright suggests that Wittgenstein thought that philosophical problems reflected the sickness of our time, which could only be cured by an alteration in our way of life, and Von Wright endorses this approach. I tend to agree with Dilman that it was, in fact, not Wittgenstein's. Made in response to it, though, Dilman's insistence that philosophy must remain at the level of the personal is a rejection of the idea that philosophy should become political. For Von Wright's suggestion clearly implies a political programme for changing a supposedly sick way of life, to which the philosopher contributes by exposing the disorders to which it gives rise. It is at least not obvious that there is no philosophical task to be performed here. Insisting, however, that philosophy remain at the level of the personal is itself a political intervention, and one which has, at Swansea, overtly functioned thus.
I have tried to relate Dilman's book to the Swansea tradition but may well have done it, and that tradition, less than justice. While my remarks have been mainly critical I must also acknowledge the virtues of singlemindedness and resourcefulness which the book evinces. The natural home for the discussions it contains is a flourishing and continuous philosophical community of the sort that Swansea was. The fact that such communities are vanishing fast excuses its bunker mentality. But these communities will not be defended simply by displaying the merits of the particular philosophical approaches which they nurture. There is a political task to be undertaken to protect them of a sort that Dilman deliberately abjures. In its absence a certain kind of seriousness about philosophy, and not just the Swansea Wittgensteinian sort, may disappear. Gullan-Whur's biography of Spinoza is a shining example of a scholar's whole-hearted devotion to her subject. It is not too much to say that, in this case, her meticulous reconstruction brings back to life the Dutch Jewish philosopher through a work of love. The diligence with which she approaches this task is signalled in the Acknowledgments: 'It did not prove enough to learn Dutch in order to get into the records and scholarly literature often ignored due to that language's inaccessibility.' (p. xi) One can only marvel at a writer who considers learning Dutch to not be enough. In addition to the ordinary difficulties encountered when doing research on seventeenth century characters and issues, the author also had to contend with the fact that Spinoza and his later editors often expunged from his letters important personal details. Another factor which further obscured her inquiries was the efforts by Dutch writers of the time to avoid the censorship and penalties imposed by the Dutch Reformed Church and thus to employ misleading references to persons and places in printed works. And finally the author had to invoke special assistance in dealing with the highly technical character and terms of official Jewish documents. GullanWhur's wonderful evocation of this lonely, excessively rational thinker, often disturbed by emotional extremes which he struggled to understand is that much greater an accomplishment in light of these problems. The opening chapters provide an incisive overview of Dutch-Jewish culture in the early 1600s and the Spanish influence on the marrano community in Amsterdam. A detailed genealogical investigation of Spinoza's immediate ancestors helps us to understand his father's determination to have his children brought up in a maximally orthodox fashion. A particularly good touch is the way in which the author shows how the subtle change in his first name, from Bento to Baruch to Benedict (each of which means 'blessed'), indicates his different situation with regard to the prevailing trends in Spanish, Jewish and Latin sentiment. Gullan-Whur lays the ground for her later assertions about Spinoza's eccentric attitudes by uncovering general features of marrano sentiments towards women and the writings of Spanish mystics. One of the great strengths of this biography is her ability to evoke a vivid sense of place and time by taking the reader on an occasional walking tour of Amsterdam, building up the sights, smells and sounds of city squares, narrow streets, households, prisons and asylums.
Paul Gilbert
Gullan-Whur concludes Chapter Three by carefully considering the evidence for several proposed interpretations of Spinoza's excommunication in 1656 on the instructions of the Jewish mahamad or council of elders. Chapter Four introduces a dramatic cast who will prove to be of continued significance as they enter and exit crucial scenes: Spinoza's earliest and long-lasting friends and associates, Jarig Jelles, Simon de Vries, Pieter Balling, and Frans van den Enden. The bookseller van den Enden was to play a pivotal role in Spinoza's life and thought, as the author makes abundantly clear. It was this freethinker who probably brought Descartes' works to Spinoza's attention, who taught him Greek and Latin, to whose house Spinoza removed after his excommunication, and whose daughter Clara Maria may have been the lifelong object of Spinoza's unrequited love. Van den Enden's mystical views about God or Nature as an infinite substance probably had a decisive influence on the young philosopher's unusual monist perspective, as early as his Short Treatise (pp. 93-5). Recent archival researches, first reported by Wim Klever in the Journal of the History of Ideas (1991), have uncovered several short texts in Dutch by van den Enden on the well-being of a free society and the political basis for a new type of republic which predate Spinoza's Political Treatise by several years (pp. 129-35) .
The opening of Chapter Five makes superb use of personal letters, documents and topographical description to make sense of Spinoza's move to Rijnsburg in 1660, where he thought the community of Collegiants might be an answer to his search for 'a very simple universal religion'. The author's speculations on Spinoza's sexual desires, especially for the deformed or crippled Clara Maria (pp. 124-5) and the youthful, handsome Simon de Vries (pp. 140-1) are tempting and seductive (sic), but despite the attempt to force the point, in light of the complete absence of testimony, this scenario is highly tenuous. The following chapter builds a coherent and persuasive picture of his half-hearted, almost grudging composition, at the insistence of his friends, of an exposition of Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, which he abandoned after the second of five books. In contrast to the conjectures about his sexual activities, Spinoza's general attitude toward female mentality, an attitude of contempt and denigration sadly shared by many of his contemporaries, is thoroughly exposed and well-documented. This section made me wince or cringe with exasperation (as one does sometimes); it might have been a good place to bring in the example of Descartes who was entirely unbiased on issues of gender and who thought that his most intelligent questioners were women such as Elizabeth of Bohemia and Anna van Schurman. The complex story of the manoeuvres for political power between Johann de Witt, Prince William and the Estate Holders is handled with great tact and a keen eye for the smallest detail. The demise of the Dutch Republic and Spinoza's unyielding advocacy of the rational foundations for a legitimate state show the immediate and direct manner in which a philosopher can be engaged in important social and political issue.
The final chapters are devoted to the events which surround the writing of Part Five of the Ethics and the incomplete Political Treatise. The author offers an astute reading of the few remaining letters from 1674-77 and scattered comments from those who visited Spinoza during the final phase of his tubercular decline. Study of these documents, she says, 'utterly debunks the myth of the philosopher's serenity and high-mindedness. With the exception of Spinoza's letters to his old friend Henry Oldenburg, it reveals snappiness, sloppiness and unremitting anxiety' (p. 264), at least some of which may be put down to symptoms of his illness. The brilliant young German student, von Tschirnhaus, whom many later scholars reckon to have questioned Spinoza most closely on core problems of his metaphysics often received curt and evasive replies. Gullan-Whur does not flinch from admitting that Ethics Part Five is deeply flawed, Spinoza's usually crystal clear thinking partly occluded by his inability to 'recognise the intensity of the origins of his own driving desire.' (p. 281), though Jonathan Bennett's scathing remark that 'it is rubbish which causes others to write rubbish' (p. 314) surely goes too far.
I have a great deal of respect for Gullan-Whur's achievement in this intellectual biography, so I feel almost churlish in pointing out any mistakes, most of which pertain to Descartes. But in the interests of accuracy, these errors cannot remain unremarked. The first Latin edition of the Meditations was published in 1641, the second edition in 1642 (p. 34); Descartes did not deny souls to animals, who suffered and had feelings, but denied them rational minds (ibid.). Descartes died at Queen Christina's court in February 1650 February , not 1649 . He never held the view that 'mere sense perception [was] random observation of causes' (p. 77)-a bizarre definition-perhaps one might say 'ungrounded' or 'obscure and confused' observation of causes. His concept of natural light may indeed have had its historical source in St. Augustine's notion of divine light or illumination, but for Descartes the natural light of reason could not be 'confused with flashes of religious revelation' (p. 108); what was not open to rational insight was an issue of 'divine grace' or the 'light of grace' which Descartes said was best left to theologians. It's simply preposterous that Descartes 'allowed for ignorance, for faith in religion; for mystery and miracle in nature; for demonic possession of mind' (p. 109), though this opinion may be true for 'other philosophers of his age'. There are several strange and unwarranted interpretations about various Cartesian topics, but since they are not strictly relevant to the exposition of Spinoza's position, it serves no good purpose to straighten them out. But her comments about Leibniz's disappointing reception in London in 1673, that 'his claims concerning infinite series revealed ignorance of current work or, worse, plagiarism ' (p. 275) , are completely unwarranted and inaccurate. Nietzsche's strange remarks about Spinoza's dogma of conatus, which he sees manifested in Darwinian claims, were written in 1882, not 1850 (before Origin of Species was published); and why does she use the wretched Foulis edition of Nietzsche from 1910, when Kaufmann's translation of The Gay Science has been around since 1974 (pp. 309, 366n)? My greatest single reservation, however, is against the author's often overt argument that it is necessary or always important for the reader to be aware of the source and context of Spinoza's specific assertions in order to understand the philosophical significance of his texts. No doubt a good grasp of these biographical factors may assist such an understanding, or even deepen one's appreciation, but it sometimes looks as though the author's labour of love for Spinoza may set her heart (and critical attention) against anyone else who is not similarly bound by a passion for this lonely, obsessed thinker.
Paul S. MacDonald New Books
Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights Movement
By Peter Singer New York, Oxford: Bowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
Henry Spira was born in Antwerp in 1927. His Jewish family emigrated to the United States in 1940, where he has lived ever since, mainly in New York. He has been the leading figure in the animal rights movement in the USA and this biography of him has been written by the leading philosopher of animal rights, at a time when Henry Spira is suffering from a cancer which is likely soon to be fatal. Singer has written this book, not merely as a tribute to a man whose work for animals he has so much admired, but to show that one person can really do a great deal to change the world for the better if he goes about it the right way. (I know, by the way, that Singer does not think the concept of rights the best conceptual tool in moral thought but it is a convenient one which he himself uses in the title of this book.) Thus the life of Henry Spira, thinks Peter Singer (and I am sure that he is right), can be of great value not merely as an inspiration, but as a guide for reformers in any field.
Henry Spira has had a varied life, working as a merchant seaman and as a teacher, and as an activist in the Socialist Worker Party, the civil rights movement, and in trade union reform. However, in 1973, at the age of forty-five, he read Peter Singer's contribution to Animals, Men and Morals edited by S. and R. Goldlovitch and John Harris and enrolled next year in an evening class taught by Peter Singer at New York University.
Thereafter he became a vegetarian and an animal rights campaigner. He formed his own organization, Animal Rights International, but this consisted virtually just in himself. Untrammelled by the bureaucracy of standard anti-vivisection and animal welfare societies he organized a series of campaigns to right particular abuses, in which a wide alliance of organizations joined for each particular project. The targets initially selected for his campaigns were not those which represented the worst abuse of animals, but those in which campaigning seemed likely to have some actual effect, and thereby to prepare the ground for subsequent ever more ambitious projects.
His main campaigns were as follows:
(1) a successful campaign against research on the sex life of variously mutilated cats at the American Museum of Natural History; (2) a successful campaign against experiments sponsored by Amnesty International in which pigs were burnt with hot metal rods and given electric shocks in order to find out how it could best be proved that human beings had been tortured in similar ways; (3) a repeal of the New York legislation which permitted dogs and cats in pounds to be used for vivisection; (4) persuading Revlon cosmetics to invest in research to replace the Draize test (dripping the product on the eyes of conscious rabbits to see how badly damaged they were after how long) and eventually replacing it;
(5) persuading Procter and Gamble to replace the LD 50 test (feeding a large number of animals with a product to see how long it took to kill half of them) by a new method which used far less animals; (6) an unsuccessful campaign against conditions in which chickens were housed by Perdue farms (a mass market chicken producer); (7) a successful campaign to persuade the US Department of Agriculture to abolish their requirement that all cattle imported from Mexico be branded facially with a hot iron (so that they could be quickly identified if they were the source of a TB outbreak); (8) a campaign to persuade McDonald's (of the big Mac) to set and monitor high standards of animal welfare on the part of its suppliers.
Almost all of these campaigns except the last (still continuing) were complete or partial successes.
In the course of examining Spira's methods Singer picks out ten principles by following which he had far more concrete successes than any other animal welfare rights or welfare organizations operating in the US:
(1) trying to understand current public thinking and where it is open to influence; (2) selecting targets causing serious animal suffering and vulnerable to public opinion; (3) concentrating on practically achievable goals; (4) being really well informed; (5) not dividing the world into saints and sinners and relating appreciatively to organizations ready to introduce real improvements; (6) co-operating in designing improvements with responsive organizations; (7) using public confrontation and adverse publicity only when organizations are completely non-responsive; (8) avoiding the bureaucracy endemic to many animal welfare or rights organizations; (9) recognizing that much reform does not require new legislation but can be done directly by direct influence on an organization; (10) always asking seriously whether it will work before starting a campaign. (I am struck by the similarity of some of these principles to those of Christian just war theory.)
Action upon these principles sometimes alienated animal organizations which would avoid anything like compromise with 'the enemy'. Singer claims with justification that there is much to be learnt from the practical effectiveness of this approach for all those engaged in social reform, although one must add to his list the need for a certain con brio which is not available to everyone. In any case here we have a moral philosopher, who has himself done an enormous amount for the cause with which he is especially associated analysing the means by which the main American animal rights campaigner has had such great successes. Since there is still much which needs to be done for that cause around the globe it is to be hoped that individuals will continue to emerge who can work
